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On June 15, 1975, and notwithstanding his physical and men-
tal problems, the Plaintiff returned to work in the mines where 
he continued to work without significant interruption until April 
21, 1976. Tr. Vol. I, p. 136. During that time, Plaintiff con-
tinued to obtain chiropractic adjustments for his physical prob-
lems and therapy for his depression. 
In May, 1976, Plaintiff sought follow-up medical treatment 
for his back which had some limitation in motion and additional 
tenderness in his left buttocks. He also had decreased sensation 
over the lateral aspect of his calf and foot on the left side. 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 167 and 409; and Vol. I, p. 47. 
Subsequently, on June 29, 1976, a three-level fusion was 
performed by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg at the L.D.S. Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Tr. Vol. I, p. 48; and Vol. II, p. 167. 
Because two of the levels failed, a second surgery was performed 
on December 1, 1977, where Plaintiff's back was again re-fused. 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 190-191 and 409. 
On March 21, 1977, and as a result of those two surgeries, 
the Industrial Commission approved a Compensation Agreement 
awarding Plaintiff a 25% permanent partial impairment of the 
whole body for his orthopedic problems. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24. 
Over five years later, on June 11, 1982, Plaintiff filed an 
Application for Hearing requesting an additional permanent par-
tial impairment award for his psychiatric problems and, also, 
requesting consideration of a permanent total disability award. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 37. 
Dr. Potts, Plaintiff's treating physician of approximately 
five years, confirmed Plaintiff's permanent total disability 
status by letter on September 24, 1984 by stating that he was 
"... unable to work or perform steadily...." and that he doubted 
that "... his position [would] improve". Tr. Vol. II, p. 156. 
Dr. Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic con-
firmed Plaintiff's inability to work, and indicated that the 
Plaintiff is impaired in social, family and vocational function-
ing, in a medical report of February 13, 1985. This report fur-
ther substantiated Plaintiff's total disability status. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 613. 
Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Corners Community Mental Health 
Center in Castle Dale, Utah also confirmed Plaintiff's permanent 
total disability status by letter of May 21, 1985 indicating that 
"... my impression at this time is that the employee is suffering 
from post traumatic stress disorder with depression. His rumina-
tion of the traumatic event, his anxiety and severe physical pain 
could most definitely prevent him from working at this time". 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 613-614. 
And finally, Dr. Ronald G. Rubin, a psychiatrist in Price, 
Utah, in a letter of July 10, 1985, pursuant to a Division of 
Rehabilitation referral, indicated that Plaintiff was neither 
rehabilitable now nor was he expected to be so in the future, was 
not employable now or in the future, and was not able to partake 
in a new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled. Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 614. 
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On October 9, 1984, the Administrative Law Judge denied 
Plaintiff's claim to an additional award for his psychiatric 
impairment, but found him "... tentatively permanently and total-
ly disabled and referred [him] to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A." Tr. Vol. II, p. 412, 
On July 31, 1985, the Utah State Board of Education, Divi-
sion of Rehabilitation Services, found that Plaintiff was ineli-
gible for rehabilitation because his handicap was "too severe" 
and a recent psychiatric evaluation revealed that he had f!. . . no 
significant work potential...." In addition to Plaintiff's phys-
ical and mental impairments, that Division also found that he had 
borderline intellectual functioning and reading skills primarily 
as a result of his dropping out of school in the tenth grade. 
The Division issued the Section 67 certification by concluding 
that there was no lf. . . reasonable expectation that vocational 
rehabilitation services [could] benefit [him] in terms of employ-
ability." Tr. Vol. II, p. 562. 
On December 11, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order finding that 
the Plaintiff was "... entitled to benefits for permanent total 
disability benefits from and after July 31, 1985...." Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 564. The date chosen by the Adminsitrative Law Judge 
for the commencement of benfits was the date of the Section 67 
Division of Rehabilitation certification of non-entitlement to 
rehabilitation services. Tr. Vol. II, p. 562. No mention was 
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made in the Order for the payment of interest on unpaid benefits 
then long since due. Tr. Vol. II, pp* 561-565. 
On December 19, 1985, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Recon-
sideration/Motion for Review challenging the onset date of perma-
nent total disability benefits, and the lack of an award for 
statutory interest on the unpaid but due benefits. Tr. Vol. II, 
pp. 569-573. Plaintiff argued that computing permanent total 
disability benefits based upon the date of the rehabilitation 
letter is inconsistent with longstanding Industrial Commission 
policy wherein permanent total disability benefits onset dates 
are computed from the date of Plaintiff's industrial accident, or 
the date on which the Plaintiff las^ worked, whichever is lat-
er. Tr. Vol. II, p. 569. In addition, Plaintiff argued that 
statutory interest is awarded on permanent total disability bene-
fits as it is on any other unpaid but due Workers1 Compensation 
benefits. Tr. Vol. II, p. 572. 
On March 13, 1986, the Industrial Commission granted in part 
and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion for Peconsideration/Mot ion 
for Review. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 574-576. Specifically, the Indus-
trial Commission held fl. . . that the first date of medical con-
firmation of the Applicants permanent total disability status is 
a more appropriate date to begin permanent total disability bene-
fits...11 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 576) and ". . . that an award for inter-
est is inappropriate.../1 Tr. Vol. II, p. 576. No explanation 
for either of these two conclusions was given in the Order. 
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Plaintiff timely petitioned this Court for review of the 
Industrial Commission's final administrative decision. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 578. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Industrial Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ordered the payment of 
permanent total disability benefits to commence on September 24, 
1984. Plaintiff contends that the proper date for the commence-
ment of such benefits is April 22, 1976 which is the last day 
Plaintiff was able to work as a coal miner and was forced out of 
the work force by his industrial injury. All of the medical and 
other evidence submitted supports Plaintiff's argument that his 
disabling symptoms are attributable to his 1975 industrial in-
jury. To select a date other than April 22, 1976 is an arbitrary 
and capricious act. 
And finally, Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commis-
sion erred in refusing to award interest in compliance with Utah 
Code Annotated §35-1-78 (1981). Continued refusal of the Indus-
trial Commission to comply with the statutory requirements and 
this Court's interpretations thereof underscores the Industrial 
Commission's tenuous position in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE 
HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD 
RECOMPUTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF BENEFITS ON APRIL 22, 1976, THE "DAT 
FOLLOWING HIS LAST DAY OF WORK 
The remedial nature of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act 
is to assure, among other things, that workers who are injured 
while performing their duties are compensated for the loss suf-
fered as a result of an industrial accident. The Workmen's Comp-
ensation Act provides for various types of benefits to which 
employees are entitled as soon as a compensable injury removes 
them from the work force. 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-64 (1973) mandates when compensa-
tion under the Workmen1s Compensation Act must commence. This 
commencement date, which is no lateii than three days after the 
injury, or sooner, supports Plaintiff's position that the criti-
cal date is when the injured employee was forced out of the work 
force by his injury. 
In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintifffs last day 
of work as a coal miner was April 21, 1976. More importantly, 
there is no dispute that all the medical reports submitted herein 
conclude that it was the industrial injury sustained by Plaintiff 
on May 12, 1975 that rendered him permanently totally disabled 
and has forced him out of the work force. All of Plaintiff's 
disabling symptoms, according to the uncontradicted medical re-
ports, are attributable to his 1975 industrial injury. 
The Industrial Commission, without any expressed reason, 
arbitrarily and capriciously selected September 24, 1984, as the 
date from which permanent total disability benefits shall be paid 
notwithstanding the fact that he hasi not worked for over _a dec-
ade! 
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It should be noted that Plaintiff1s argument is based upon 
the long adhered to Indutrial Commission rule that payment of 
benefits shall commence on the date of the accident or the last 
day an injured employee worked, whichever is later. Notwith-
standing that rule, the Industrial Commission for the first time 
in 70 years has arbitrarily and capriciously discerned that a new 
rule should be implemented regarding identifying the date for the 
commencement of the payment of benefits. 
What the Industrial Commission is so vainly attempting to 
conceal is its effort to arbitrarily limit the financial exposure 
of the Second Injury Fund by fiat rather than by seeking approp-
riate legislative relief, thereby, once again, ignoring the rec-
ommendation of this Court that the Legislature is the appropriate 
forum to limit the financial exposure of the Second Injury 
Fund. 
By arbitrarily and capriciously picking a later onset date, 
the financial exposure of the Second Injury Fund can be limited 
without the authority of any statutory, regulatory or case law. 
In fact, this arbitrary change in policy overrules 70 years of 
the Commission's own procedural history. 
This arbitrary and capricious choice of the Industrial Com-
mission is wholly without cause and is not supported by any sub-
stantial evidence. Billings Computer Corporation v. Tarango, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 104 (1983). To preserve the remedial nature of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and even the integrity of the 
Industrial Commission, this Court must reverse the Commission's 
decision in this case. To fulfill the purpose of the Workmen's 
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Compensation Act and secure workers from becoming objects of 
charity by making reasonable compensation, Platiniff urges this 
Court to rule that the onset date for the payment of benefits to 
which he is entitled be the date he was forced out of the work 
force by the industrial accident. 
II 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY INTEREST 
ON HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-78 (1981) provides that awards 
made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8%, from the date each benefit payment would have other-
wise become due and payable. 
Invoking this clear and unambiguous statute merely requires 
that the Plaintiff demonstrate his entitlement to benefits. Once 
an employee is entitled to benefits, the statute requires that 
interest at the stated rate be paid. This interpretation was 
recently approved by this Court in Marshall v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (1985). 
Despite the clear and unambigupus language of the statute 
and this Courtfs interpretation of it, the Industrial Commission 
refused to award Plaintiff interest on the benefits awarded. 
Such action by the Industrial Commission forces workers, such as 
Plaintiff, to seek redress in this Court. A statute which is so 
simple and clear as to purpose should not result in an appeal. 
Plaintiff submits that the Industrial Commission has once 
again demonstrated its intention to Refuse to follow the dictates 
of this Court and the Legislature when it declined to award in-
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terest. Plaintiff further submits that the Industrial Commis-
sion's action in refusing to pay interest is additional evidence 
of its arbitrary attempt to limit the financial exposure of the 
Second Injury Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission be directed, once again, to comply with the Workers1 
Compensation statutory requirements of the law as they have been 
interpreted by the decisions of this Court. The clear and con-
sistent failure of the Industrial Commission to do so only ex-
acerbates injured workers1 compensation rights, violates the 
remedial nature of Workers1 Compensation legislation, and further 
and unnecessarily results in needless appeals being taken to this 
Court for the purpose of reversing arbitrary and capricious deci-
sions of the Industrial Commission. The final administrative 
decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed and 
remanded with direction to recompute the Plaintiff's permanent 
total disability benefits from April 22, 1976, with interest from 
that date as required by the Code. 
DATED this 18th day of August, L9£6. 
EY bt DABNEY, P/JC: ' 
w\fs "DABNEY / E?O"J 
eys for Plaintiff 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this the 
18th day of August, 1986, upon the following: 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
124 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Henry K. Chai III, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84TiO 
DABfe NEBf & pABNEY, P f C 
v IRG ifror'ftflfiraY, { ES 
Attorney^ for Plainti 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CHARLES OMAN 
Appicant, * 
COMPENSATION^ ' w 
PEABOOY COAL COflPAHV , * 
(Saployer) * 
OLD REPUBLIC COMPANIES * 
* 
(Insurance Carrier) * 
• 





WHEREAS, Charles Oman sustained a personal injury by 
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on the 12th day 
of May 19.75while employed by Peabody Coal Company ; 
which accident has been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State 
of Utah. According to the physician's reports and agreement between the parties 
hereto, said Applicant sustained, as a result of said accident, temporary total 
disability and/or permanent partial disability, as well as incurring medical and/ 
or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth: 
May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and 
1. Temporary total disability from April 30, 1976 to December 3% 1976 Inc. 
payable at the rate of $ 95.33per week for a total of $ So^Z. 1 1 . 
*2. Permanent partial disability based on 73 weeks payable at the rate of 
$ 95.33per week beginning January 1, 19// for a total of 7435.74 
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows: 
25% permanent partial disability 
3* Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid in connection with this claim: 
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous Incurred $ 4335.41 
Paid to Date $ ^ o . < n Note 1 
Balance (if any) Due $ None 
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits Due $ 3772.34 
Paid to Date $ bbZZ.H 
Balance (if any) Due ($ 1849.77)Note 2 
(c) Total Medical and Compensation Due t 
per this Compensation Agreement: $ 5535.97 A-*rtl, -' 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amount stated in 
Section 3 above—as provided by law—the Applicant hereby releases Defendants 
from any further responsibility in connection with said accident except as may 
be changed from time to time under the powers of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah to retain continuing jurisdiction to modify awards and extend medical 
benefits. 
It is understood that this Agreement becomes binding and effective only 
when approved by a member of the Industrial Cossnission of Utah. 
0/^ Ox* <ftyyg 
Approved this 2./ day of v?-fsi^ 
Note 1: Travel and per diem of $351.90 was also paid. "uu^-
* Supporting medical evidence of permanent partial disability must accompany 
this form. 
Note 2: 31 weeks compensation was paid at rate of $155.00 in error. 
NOTE: Original will be retained by the Corrcnission. Signed copies will be 
returned to the Insurance Carrier. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 82002249 
CHARLES G. OMAN, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or 
OLD REPUBLIC and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24, 
1984 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and,Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, Peabody Coal Company and/or Old 
Republic Insurance, were represented by Henry Chai, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert 
Martinez, Administrator. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May 
12, 1975 during the course c<f his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The 
occurrence of the accident is not questioned but the extent of injuries 
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt. 
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost 
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a 
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time 
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from 
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant 
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to 
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in 
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the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine 
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously 
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of 
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on 
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three 
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his 
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he 
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even 
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such 
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for 
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to 
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15, 
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis 
unilateral on the left side." He continued seeing a chiropractor quite 
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also 
went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained 
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness 
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of 
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he 
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back 
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful 
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without 
interruption until around April of 1976* During that time he continued to 
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent 
or at what frequency these adjustments were administered* The records of the 
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located. 
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor 
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after 
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred 
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first 
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of 
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased 
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but 
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a 
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The 
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of 
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was 
done in December of 1977. 
4. After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a 
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This 
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability 
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April 
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent 
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that 
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such 
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery 
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of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant 
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion 
had failed and that further surgery was recommended. Liability for the 
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its 
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional 
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent 
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had 
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the 
permanent partial disability. 
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation 
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980. 
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may 
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The 
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that 
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total 
disability. 
6. From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no 
increase in the applicant's ^ permanent partial impairment due to his back 
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his 
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to 
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not 
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr. 
Frank Dituri, a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of 
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the 
applicant's psychiatric problems. This evaluation was made without the 
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr. 
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The 
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who 
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri's earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric 
impairment. Dr. Dituri recently responded to a request from the 
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is 
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with 
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in 
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident as having 
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his records to finding no evidence of 
ratable impairment as early as January, 1977 is based on his incorrect 
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was 
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health 
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant 
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March 
12, 1975. 
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather 
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by 
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled. 
CHARLES G. OMAN 
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It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling 
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than 
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more 
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work: and 
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric 
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced 
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The 
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to 
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that 
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now, 
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally 
disabled. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any 
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was 
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis. The 
surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to 
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric 
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable* 
After this long length of - time there is probably no realistic hope 
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at 
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became 
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his 
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but 
this only compounded the problems because it removed him *from active 
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to 
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible. 
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were 
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was 
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the 
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his 
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he 
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the 
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that 
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the 
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status. 
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative 
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives: 
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon 
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977 
compensation agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of 
limitations, (2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a 
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of 
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still 
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more th^n nine years after the 
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and 
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totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which 
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations 
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from 
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing 
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel 
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the 
ffdoctrine of res judicata.. .is not in the strict sense applicable to 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an 
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same 
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does 
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction 
invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any 
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of 
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is 
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It 
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the 
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until 
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago. 
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives. 
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a 
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the 
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The 
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures 
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for 
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may 
be so deeply &ntrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not 
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a 
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can 
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is 
incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of 
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of 
Brunddge v. IML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980). 
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded 
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant 
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred 
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and 
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation 
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant 
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before 
the evaluation by Rehabilitation Services. Obviously, any other 
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and 
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by 
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification 
of the prior compensation agreement entered into in 1977 and the 
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to 
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late 
datec This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which 
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period 
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the 
Commission's inability to do so. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively 
permanently and totally disabled and referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final 
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees 
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to 
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time.% A further 
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the 
relevant information has been submitted. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this /^day of October, 1984-
ATTEST: 
'"'KlAcrs? 
Strasburg, Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on October tf . 1984 a copy of the attached ORDER 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Charles G. Oman 
P.O. Box 853 
Castle Dale, Ut. 84513 
Virginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 412, 136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Henry Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
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PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or * 
OLD REPUBLIC and SECOND * 
INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May 
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The 
occurrence of the accident - is not questioned but the extent of injuries 
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt. 
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost 
their lives and others were injured. One of those w^o was killed was only a 
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time 
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from 
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant 
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to 
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in 
the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine 
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously 
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of 
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on 
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three 
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his 
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he 
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even 
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such 
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for 
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to 
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15, 
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis 
unilateral on the left side." He continued - seeing a chiropractor quite 
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also 
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went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained 
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness 
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of 
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he 
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back 
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful 
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without 
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to 
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent 
or at what frequency- these adjustments were administered. The records of the 
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located. 
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor 
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after 
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred 
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first 
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of 
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased 
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but 
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a 
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The 
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of 
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was 
done in December of 1977. 
A. After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a 
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This 
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability 
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April 
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent 
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that 
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such 
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery 
of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant 
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion 
had failed and that further surgery was recommended. Liability for the 
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its 
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional 
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent 
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had 
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the 
permanent partial disability. 
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation 
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980. 
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may 
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The 
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that 





6. From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no 
increase in the applicant's permanent partial impairment due to his back 
injury, this was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his 
opinion as late as 1982. the only evidence of increased impairment relates to 
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not 
rated by any physician until March of 1983. this rating was assigned by Dr. 
Frank Dituri,. a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of 
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the 
applicant's psychiatric problems. this evaluation was made without the 
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr. 
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records, the 
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. tedrow, a psychiatrist, who 
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric 
impairment. Dr. tedrow recently responded to a request from the 
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is 
obvious from his letter dated August 7t 1984 that he made a mistake with 
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in 
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident having 
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his reference to "finding no evidence 
of ratable impairment as early as January, 1977ff, is based on his incorrect 
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was 
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health 
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant 
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March 
12, 1975. A subsequent letter from Dr. tedrow dated October 12, 1984 
confirmed this typographical error and the pre—existing problem but he could 
not rate it. 
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather 
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by 
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled. 
It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling 
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than 
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more 
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and 
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric 
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced 
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. the 
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to 
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that 
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now, 
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally 
disabled. 
there is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any 
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was 




surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to 
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric 
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable. 
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope 
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at 
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became 
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his 
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but 
this only compounded the problems because it removed him from active 
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to 
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible. 
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were 
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was 
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the 
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his 
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. the fact that he 
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the 
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that 
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the 
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status. 
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative 
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives: 
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon 
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977 
compensation agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of 
limitations, (2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a 
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of 
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still 
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the 
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which 
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations 
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from 
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing 
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel 
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the 
"doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an 
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same 
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does 




invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any 
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of 
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is 
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It 
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the 
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until 
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago. 
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives. 
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a 
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the 
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The 
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures 
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for 
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may 
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not 
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a 
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can 
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is 
incumbant upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of 
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of 
Brundige v. XML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980). 
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded 
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant 
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred 
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and 
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation 
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant 
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before 
the evaluation by Rehabilitation Services. Obviously, any other 
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and 
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by 
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification 
of the prior compensation agreement entered into in 1977 and the 
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to 
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late 
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which 
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period 
prescribed by statute- in the instant case was npt attributable to the 





IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively 
permanently and totally disabled and referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final 
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees 
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to 
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time, A further 
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the 
relevant information has been submitted. 
Richard G. Sums ion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed, by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this. ">j -dav of October, 1984. 
ATTEST: 
^vT^T> . .^ 
/ 
Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary 
/ 
is 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on 0ctoberj2i3.i 1984 a copy of the attached 
AMENDED ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Charles G. Oman 
P.O. Box 853 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Virginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 412, 136 South Main 
Salt Lake. City, Utah 84101 
Henry Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
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Defendants. 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24, 
1984, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law 
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or Old 
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai, 
II, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A. 
Martinez, Administrator. 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 14, 
1985, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law 
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/ or Old 
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K* Chai, 
II, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V. 
Boot-man, Administrator. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered in 
this matter on October 9, 1984, and an Amended Order was entered on October 
23, 1984, Insofar as the Findings of Fact expressed in the two prior Orders 
are not inconsistent with the Findings made herein, the same are incorporated 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
2. The original Order made a tentative finding that the Applicant 
was permanently and totally disabled, and he was referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training, and certification as 
required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. There was a specific finding made that no 
compensation for permanent total disability was to be awarded until a final 
determination was made relative to that issue. 
3. At the last hearing on November 14, 1985, evidence was intro-
duced relative to the rehabilitation evaluation. The Applicant underwent 
feasibility studies and was placed in a program where he received tutoring in 
basic skills. He made positive but slow progress for a while; but finally on 
July 31, 1985, Rehabilitation Services certified that the Applicant did not 
meet or no longer met the legal requirement of a reasonable expectation that 
vocational rehabilitation services would benefit him in terms of employ-
ability. The reason for the certification that the Applicant is not a good 
candidate for rehabilitation appears to be threefold: (1) He has borderline 
intellectual functioning and reading skills; (2) he suffers from a long-term 
depressive neurosis; and (3) he lacks funds that might otherwise enable him to 
pursue a long-term rehabilitation program. 
4. At the last hearing the Defendants presented a substantial 
amount of evidence relative to the Applicant's activities over the past 
several years. The thrust of this evidence was to establish that the 
Applicant was in fact a partner with his wife in the operation of Kelly's Bar 
in Castledale, U*ah, and that he h3d also formerly been involved with his wife 
in the operation of Chick's Fish *N Chips. The evidence also strongly implies 
that the Applicant derived an unspecified amount of income from Christmas tree 
sales. The Applicant testified that the Christmas tree sales were actually an 
attempt on the part of his teenage daughter to earn some income and that he 
was not involved in this business even though many of the customers wrote out 
checks in his name in payment for the trees. He further testified that the 
bar and restaurant operations were operated solely by his wife and that his 
name appeared on licenses, tax returns, sales invoices, lease agreements, 
et cetera, only for the purpose of credit or other business needs but was 
never intended ta^an actual partnership. Some of the evidence presented 
showed rather clearly that a lot of personal expenses were being run through 
the business accounts, and the evidence rather clearly indicated the Applicant 
spent quite a bit of time at the bar and that perhaps he even helped out on 
occasion to a limited extent. It seems rather clear from the evidence that 
the townspeople regarded the Applicant and his wife as the owners and 
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operators of these businesses even though the Applicant's time involvement was 
much less than that of his wife. 
5. Tax returns filed by the Applicant and his wife were submitted 
after the hearing for the years 1979 through 198A. In each case these were 
joint returns, but for each year they showed the income and expenses of 
Kelly's Bar as a sole proprietorship operated by Charles Oman. The returns 
reflect substantial gross receipts from the bar, but the net income for the 
years 1979 through 1982 showed either a loss or only nominal net income. 
Clearly, if the only thing derived by the Applicant and his wife from the 
operation of the bar was the amount reflected as net profit on the tax return, 
the operation of the bar could not be justified. The net profit would not 
even have been the equivalent of a minimum wage paid to part-time hired help. 
The average net profit for the years 1979 through 1983 was only 2.57 percent, 
of gross sales. There was an unexplained increase in net profit during 1983 
and 1984 even though gross sales remained about the same as they had been 
previously-. The net profit in 1983 jumped to 12.86 percent of gross sales, 
and the net profit jumped to 20.07 percent in 1984. The last two figures are 
believable and would justify the operation of the business. Although the 
income from the first four years is suspect, there may be an adequate 
explanation; but such an explanation is not deemed important to the issue 
relative to the Applicant's permanent total disability. 
6. All of the evidence presented from the Applicant's doctors and 
from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's claim for permanent 
total disability. The prospects of successful rehabilitation are not good, 
but there is the suggestion that such might still be accomplished if the 
Applicant had sufficient funds to sustain him during a long-term rehabilita-
tion program. 
7. A considerable amount of time was spent at the last hearing 
reviewing a substantial number of checks made out to the Applicant, many of 
which were under $100.00 but some of which were in excess of $100.00 and in 
some cases more than $500.00. The Applicant said that these did not represent 
income in any way but were checks simply written out by customers who wanted 
cash and the Applicant and his wife were willing to cash these checks for 
them. The Administrative Law Judge is hardly convinced of any sound business 
purpose being furthered by this practice, but there is no specific evidence of 
any other purpose. These checks are in addition to the hundred or so checks 
written out to the Applicant for Christmas trees. Most of the Christmas trees 
appear to have sold for $15.00, with the price range being $10.00 to $20.00. 
8. All of the evidence presented by the Defendants was convincing 
in showing the Applicant is far from being totally invalid. His activity 
level is such that Dave Owens, a captain in the Emery County Sheriff's Office, 
did not even know that he was disabled even though he saw him frequently. 
Lamar Guymon, sheriff of Emery County, testified that he had observed the 
Applicant limping as he walked but he also saw the Applicant frequently during 
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the course of a month and knew of his involvement in the operation of Kelly's 
Bar. 
9. In consideration of all of the evidence presented, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant is permanently and totally 
disabled, but at the same time believes this determination should be subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission. This is admittedly 
paradoxical but is based upon the belief that the Applicant's unemployability 
is in large part a result of his long-term depressive neurosis condition and 
that such might change if the Applicant had a strong enough desire to become 
employed despite his known physical limitations. It obviously will not change 
absent a change in attitude* 
10. The Applicant's combined physical and mental impairment is 
44 percent of whole body function* The Defendants entered into a compensation 
agreement with the Applicant in 1977 by which he was paid permanent partial 
disability for his 25 percent physical impairment, but nothing has ever been 
paid for his depressive neurosis. The Applicant's rate of compensation was 
$95.33 per week. This is less than the minimum amount payable as of the time 
the Applicant was certified as not being a candidate for rehabilitation on 
July 31, 1985. The minimum rate in effect at that time was $120.00 per week. 
The Defendant Insurance Carrier and its insured have no further liability in 
this matter except for the payment of ongoing medical expenses because the 
Applicant did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the 
expiration of the initial six-year period. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Applicant is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability 
from and after July 31, 1985, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission to review and amend as circumstances may require. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund preprre the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury 
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week 
commencing July 31, 1985, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not more 
than every four weeks until further Order of the Commission. The accrued 
amount shall be payable in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or 
Old Republic Insurance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of this 
accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical 
Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in 
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his 
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and 
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be 
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a 
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his 
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sums ion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of December, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on December // 1985, a copy of the attached 
Supplemental Order in the case of Charles G. Oman issued December // , 
1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law 
Kearns Building, Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Charles G. Oman 
P.O. Box 853 
Castledale, UT 84513 
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3 Attorneys for Applicant 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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17 
13 COMES NOW che Applicant, pursuant Co che Utah Workers' Compensation and 
19 Occupational Disease statutes, and the Rules and Regulations of che Utah 
20 Industrial Cannission, inter al ia, and requests che Industrial Cannission to 
21 review the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Che 
22 Administrative Law Judge of December 11, 1985 relative co che onset date of 
23 permanent cotal disability benefits, and interest, only, and m'suoport chere-
24 of, alleges and represents as follows: 
25 1. That the Supplemental Order of December 11, 1985 specifically pro-
26 vides that the cannencanent date of permanent cotal disability benefits is che 
27 date of Che Rehabilitation Services Letter certifying chat Che Applicanc was 
23 
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not a candidate for reasonable vocational rehabilitation services, namely 
July 31, 1985. 
2. That computing permanent total disability benefits based upon the 
date of the rehabilitation letter is inconsistent with long standing Indus-
trial Cannission policy wherein permanent total disability benefits onset 
dates are canputed from the date of the employee's industrial accident, or the 
date the anployee last worked, whichever is later. Permanent total disability 
is computed frcm that date on a permanent total disability weekly benefits 
basis with all temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation 
deducted frcm that anount for the purpose of determining the continuation date 
- of permanent total disability benefits. 
3. That counsel is not aware of any other permanent total disability 
ccomencement date in any other claim ever being held to comnence with the date 
of a State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certification letter, 
and that the only reason for doing so would b£ to lessen the financial expos-
ure of emploeyrs, and in this case, the Second Injury Fund. 
4. That the July 31, 1985 onset date is contrary to nunerous findings by 
the Cannission, and other matters contained in the medical evidence which 
argue for an earlier date, assuming that the canputation basis normally used 
by Che Industrial Cannission should in one manner or another be modified: 
29 specifically, the appropriate dates relative to the permanent cotal disability 
22 question in this case are as follows: 
24 a* The date of the industrial accident was May 12, 1975. 
b* The Applicant has not worked since 1976; in fact, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge in the Amended Order of October 23, 1984 specifically found 
27 chat "... the Applicant has not been gainfully employed for Che oast eight 








c. The Application alleging permanent total disability is dated 
June 11, 1982 and it was filed on August 19, 1982, 
d. The first hearing held in this matter involving, among other 
things, the issue of permanent total disability, was held on September 29, 
1984. 
e. Dr. Potts, the Applicant's treating physician of approximately 
five years, indicated the Applicant's permanent total disability status on 
September 24, 1984 by stating that he "... unable to work or perform steadily 
..." and that he doubted that "... his position [would] improve". Hearing 
Exhibit No. A-l. 













- 1984 specifically concluded that "... the facts warrant a tentative finding of 
permanent and total disability...." Amended Order, p'. 5 (emphasis added). 
.- g. The State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services cannenced 
vocational feasibility studies of the Applicant in October, 1984 and attempted 
to rehabilitate the Applicant for a period of almost nine months, all without 
success. See Hearing Exhibit No. A-19. 
h. The Administrative Law Judge by letter to the State Office of 
Education Rehabilitation Services referred the Applicant for vocational rehab-
ilitation by that agency on November 15, 1984. 
i. Dr. Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic 
23 indicated that Che Applicant was unable Co work, and was imoaited in social, 
24 family and vocational functioning, in a medical report dated February 13, 
2g 1985, further substantiating his total disability status. 
2Q j. Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Comers Cormunity Mental Healch 
27 Canter in Castle Dale, Utah further substantiated Che Applicant's permanent 
2g total disabilicy by letter of May 21, 1985 by indicating chat "... ny iaores-
-3-
sion at this time is that the Applicant is suffering from past traunatic 
stress disorder with depression. His runination of the traunatic event, his 
anxiety and severe physical pain could most definitely prevent him fran work-
ing at this time.11 
k. Dr. Donald L. Ruben, a psychiatrist in Price, Utah, pursuant to 
a rehabilitation referral, indicated that the Applicant was not rehabilitable 
now or in the future, was not employable now or in the future, and was not 
able to partake in a^ new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled, in a letter 
dated July 10, 1985. 
1. Even the Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order of Decen-
ber 11, 1985 emphasizes that "all of Che evidence presenced from the Appli-
cant's doctors and frcm rehabilitation counselors supports Che Applicant's 
claim for permanent total disability" (emphasis added). In this regard, the 
several medical reports, principally from Dr. Potts [09/24/84], che Four 
Comers Mental Health agency [05/21/85] and Dr. Ruben [07/10/85], strongly 
infer that Che Applicant was permanently and totally disabled at least as 
early as September 24, 1984, by medical records and opinions alone! 
5. That because the onset date selected by Che Administrative Law Judge 
of July 31, 1985, the dace of Che State Office of Education Rehabilitation 
Services certification letter, clearly constitutes an error in law, it is 
respectfully requested that Che onset date be computed in accordance wich che 
usual and customary Industrial Cannission practice as referred Co aoove. 
Unquestionably, Che earlier Application date (June 11, 1982), che filing date 
(August 19, 1982), the first medical opinion letter of permanent total dis-
ability (September 24, 1984), and the date of che Centative finding of perma-
nent total disability conclusion by Che Administrative Law Judge (October 23, 












































tive dates, however, Che Applicant is not in any way waiving his position ChaC 
the usual and customary practice of the Industrial Commission to commence 
benefits as of the date of the accident, or the date of last employment, with 
appropriate offsets for temporary total compensation and permanent partial 
compensation being made, is in reality, the appropriate way to compute perma-
nent total disability benefits owed to Mr. Oman in this case. 
6. That in addition, it should also be noted that pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 535-1-78 (1981), the Applicant is also entitled to interest on all 
amounts from the point in time when they were otherwise due and payable, which 
such interpretation of Section 78 has recently been upheld by the Qtah Supreme 
Court in the decision of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, (1985). There-
fore, to the extent that the Supplemental Order of December 11, 1985 does noc 
include a provision for interest, it should also be accordingly modified. 
WHEREFORE, the Applicant respectfully requests that an appropriate and 
earlier onset date be made in this case, and that an appropriate award be made 
for interest pursuant to Section 78 in accordance with the Utah Supreme Court 
recent ruling on that question. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 1985. 
Actoraeys. foe AnaLicaat. , 
:oregoing 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILII 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 































Utah Industrial Ccranission 
L60 East 300 South 
P. 0. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake CiCy, Utah 84145-0580 
Henry K. Chai II, Esq. 
SNCW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTIJJEAU 
9 Exchange Place, 12th Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Mr. Charles G. Oman 
P. 0. Box 853 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Attorneys/for Applicant 
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vs. * 
PEABGDY COAL COMPANY and/ or * 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On December 11, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding 
the Applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits, 
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund beginning July 31, 1985, the date when 
the State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certified that the 
Applicant was not susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the 
Applicant's attorney filed a Motion for Review objecting to the date payments 
were ordered to begin. The Counsel for the Applicant argues that the 
Commission practice has been to award permanent total disability benefits 
either beginning the date the employee was injured, or the date the employee 
ceased working. The Counsel for the Applicant also requested an award of 
interest on the benefits awarded. The Commission is of the opinion that an 
earlier date is appropriate for the beginning of the permanent total 
disability benefits, however the Commission declines adding interest to the 
award. A brief review of tha file follows. 
The Applicant was injured, while in the course of his employment, on 
May 12, 1975 in a mine cave-in. The Applicant injured his back, and had two 
back surgeries as a result. The Applicant also experienced considerable 
psychiatric problems resulting from the trauma involved in the cave-in (in 
which several miners were killed). The Applicant returned to work 
approximately one month after the cave-in, and worked for almost a year 
afterwards, during which time he saw a chiropractor. In June 1976, the 
Applicant had back surgery (performed by Dr. T. Soderberg) and the Applicant 
was deemed stabilized in December 1976. The Defendant/carrier paid temporary 
total compensation in 1975 and 1976 for the periods the Applicant did not 
work, and also paid for a 25% permanent partial impairment rated by Dr. 
Soderberg in December 1976. The Applicant required additional surgery in 
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December 1977 as a result of non-fusion, and the Defendant/carrier paid for 
the sursery and the attendant temporary total disability. The Applicant was 
declared stable in September 1978, and no further permanent partial 
impairment, beyond the 25% already awarded, resulted. 
On August 18, 1982, the Applicant, through counsel, filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Commission, claiming permanent total 
disability benefits, or additional permanent partial impairment benefits. In 
support of the claim, in November 1983, the Counsel for the Applicant 
submitted two physician reports. Both reports discussed the Applicant's 
psychiatric impairment resulting from the May 12, 1975 accident, and one of 
the reports rated the impairment at 25% of the whole man. The Defendants 
denied a claim for further permanent partial impairment benefits based on the 
8 year Statute of Limitation specified in U.C.A. 35-1-66. The Counsel for the 
Applicant argued that the Statute of Limitation did not apply because the 
issue was permanent total disability for which the Supreme Court determined no 
Statute of Limitation applied, and because the Cotnmission had continuing 
jurisdiction under U.C.A. 35-1-78. A Hearing was held September 24, 1984, and 
the Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on October 9, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge made a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability, and the Applicant was referred to the 
State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services. On November 14, 1985, a 
second Hearing was held to allow testimony regarding the Applicant's 
empioyability. This issue arose when it was determined the Applicant may have 
had some involvement in several businesses in which his wife and daughter were 
engaged. 
The final Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, now at issue, was filed on December 11, 1985. In that Order, the 
Administrative Law Judge found the Applicant permanently totally disabled as a 
result of Rehabilitation Services' inability to rehabilitate the Applicant 
after nearly one year of attempts. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the 
Second Injury Fund to begin permanent total disability benefits as of July 31, 
1985, the date Rehabilitation Services certified the Applicant as not 
susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the Commission received 
the Applicant's Motion for Review arguing for an earlier date when permanent 
total disability should begin, and requesting an award of interest on the 
final aw?rd. The Counsel for the Applicant submits a long list of alternative 
earlier dates that should have been selected by the Administrative Law Judge 
as the beginning of permanent total disability. These include, May 12, 1975 
the date of injury; sometime in 1976 when the Applicant ceased working; June 
11, 1982 the date of the Application for Hearing; August 19, 1982 the date the 
Application was filed; September 24, 1984 when the Applicant's treating 
physician first found the Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; 
October 23, 1984, the date the Administrative Law Jud$e tentatively found the 
Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; November 15, 1984, the date the 
Applicant was referred to Rehabilitation Services, February 13, 1985, when the 
CHARLES G. OMAN 
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University of Utah Pain Clinic doctor found the Applicant disabled; May 21, 
1985, when a community health center employee found the Applicant was 
prevented from working; and finally, June 10, 1985 when a psychiatrist found 
the Applicant was not employable or rehabilitative. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the first date of medical 
confinnation of the Applicant's permanent total disability status is a more 
appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits. The Commission 
therefore finds the benefits should begin as of September 24, 1984. The 
Commission finds that an award of interest is inappropriate, and therefore the 
final Commission award is as follows. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury 
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week 
commencing September 24, 1984, and continuing thereafter at intervals of' not 
more than every four weeks until further order of the Commission. The accrued 
amount shall be payable in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Peabody Coal Company 
and/or Old Republic Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as the result 
of this accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in 
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his 
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and 
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be 
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a 
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his 
attorney as may be ordered by the CommissionV 
Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman \ 
Walter- T. Axelgard/ Commissioiyar 
Lenice L. Nielsen, Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of .Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
XjflrW of March, IS 
'Linda J. Strasburg, Commission/Secretary 
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